Mr. Chairman,
Let me say at the outset that Sweden stands fully behind the statements made earlier in the Main Committee I and in this Subsidiary body by Luxembourg on behalf of the European Union and by New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition.
I now take the floor on behalf of Austria, Ukraine and Sweden to elaborate on the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
At the 2000 Review Conference, the nuclear weapons states committed themselves to "further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process". In the preparatory committee leading up to this Conference, proposals have been made on how to take this matter forward. In this context, I would like to draw your attention to the working paper by Austria, Ukraine and Sweden submitted to the Third Prepcom, entitled NPT/Conf.2005/PC.III/WP.13. The issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons has been identified as one on which progress needs to and could be made.
The reasons are the following:
· Non-strategic nuclear weapons are a global concern. Due to the lack of transparency, general knowledge of these weapons is limited. The estimated numbers, depending on definitions, range between 7,000 and 20,000. · Non-strategic nuclear weapons are an integral part of the global nuclear disarmament agenda. It is part of the unequivocal undertaking to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons to which the nuclear-weapon states committed themselves at the 2000 Review Conference.· Non-strategic nuclear weapons pose threats. Their portability and the possibility of forward deployment could increase the risk of proliferation and of use. They could be appealing to terrorists due to their relatively small size and the availability of delivery systems for such weapons. · Non-strategic nuclear weapons have so far been neglected in arms control and disarmament negotiations.
We thank the Russian Federation for the information provided with regards to measures undertaken to ensure and enhance security and physical protection for their non-strategic nuclear weapons. We look forward to more detailed information on the eliminated weapons put in the context of existing weapons - strategic and non-strategic, deployed and stored - by all States possessing these weapons.
We propose that the following measures be considered:
1. Further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process, by all states possessing such weapons. 2. Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. 3. Development of further confidence-building and transparency measures by all states possessing non-strategic nuclear weapons in order to reduce the threats posed by them. 4. Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear-weapon systems, including systems for non-strategic nuclear-weapons. 5. Agreement by the Russian Federation and the United States of America to reaffirm, fully implement and codify the 1991/1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, thus facilitating verification and transparency, and to initiate negotiations on further reduction of these weapons with a view to their total elimination. This mechanism could be extended to all states possessing non-strategic nuclear weapons. 6. Further measures to ensure and enhance security and physical protection for the storage and transport of non-strategic nuclear weapons, their components and related materials.
We thank you for having included language on this issue in your non-paper. We support the language in paragraph 2.2 in its entirety, i.e. "Building upon the decisions taken at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, urge further progress by the nuclear-weapon States in reducing or continuing to reduce their non-strategic and strategic nuclear arsenals".
We would also very much like to see that the proposal on this issue made by the European Union in its Common Position be reflected in the Final Declaration. The language could be along the following lines:
"The Conference agrees on the need to implement the 1991/1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives by the USSR/ Russian Federation and the United States, and on the need for all states possessing non-strategic nuclear weapons to include them in their general disarmament processes with a view to their elimination."
Let me also make some comments in my national capacity on your non-paper.
Sweden agrees with those delegations that have said that your paper is a very good basis for a final agreement on nuclear disarmament in this Conference. What do not want to see a renegotiation of the previous agreements made on nuclear disarmament from 1995 and 2000. These agreements are there and we need to preserve them. We would also like to see the operationalisation of measures on which progress should and could realistically be made at this point in time. We do believe that you have made a very good effort with regards to this balance in your non-paper, and we could support it. We could also support the amendments previously made by Japan with regards to nuclear terrorism, the international monitoring system of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, and the importance of commencing negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.